Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1995

Peter M. Coats v. Kathryn Tuck Coats : Petition for
Writ of Certiorari
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Craig M. Peterson; Attorney for Respondent.
Craig S. Cook; Attorney for Petitioner.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Coats v. Coats, No. 950058 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6407

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

PETER M. COATS,
Petitioner,
No.
vs

c?s~oc>^- &

Court of Appeals No.
920588

KATHRYN TUCK COATS,
Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

CRAIG M. PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

CRAIG S. COOK
3645 East 3100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109

Attorney for Respondent

Attorney for Petitioner
c„N\E

irrtf* SUP*'

6 &\££

poc*^

COV3R1

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

OPINION BELOW

1

JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

Nature of the Case

3

Course of Proceedings and Statement
of Facts

2

REASONS FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT
1.

2.

12

The Court of Appeals Should Have
Reversed the Judgment or, at a Minimum,
Remanded for Further Proceedings,

13

The Court of Appeals Departed from
Accepted and Usual Course of Judicial
Proceedings by Basing Its Decision on
Factors That Were Not Properly Preserved
Below or Raised on Appeal.

14

APPENDIX
CASES CITED
Barson v. E.R. Sguibb & Sons,
682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984)

16

City of Sante Fe v. Comis,
845 P.2d 753 (N.M. 1992)

18

Cook v. Oklahoma Board of Public Affairs,
736 P.2d 140 (Okla. 1987)

13

Dole v. Bradley,
784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989)

12

Northwest Otolaryngology Asso. v. Mobilease,
786 S.W.2d 399 (Tex, App. 1990)

18

Pixon v. State Farm Auto Ins.,
809 P.2d 746 (Utah App. 1991)

18

Rucker v. Dalton,
598 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1979)

15

Rudman v. Rudman,
812 P.2d 73 (Utah App. 1991)

14

Slattery v. Covey & Co., Inc.,
857 P.2d 243 (Utah App. 1993)

13

Sorensen v. Kennecott Utah Copper Corp.,
873 P.2d 1141 (Utah App. 1994)

12

Taton v. McCalsin,
417 P.2d 316 (Okla. 1966)

13

STATUTES CITED
§78-2-2(5), U.C.A

1

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

PETER M. COATS,
Petitioner,

PETITION FOR WRIT
OF CERTIORARI

vs.
KATHRYN TUCK COATS,

NoCourt of Appeals
No. 920588

Respondent.

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the Court of Appeals depart from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings when it found the trial court's
finding of fact was clearly erroneous but affirmed the judgment on
grounds that were not preserved at trial nor raised on appeal?
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals was rendered on December
22, 1994 in an unpublished opinion which is contained in the
Appendix to this Petition.
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The decision of the Court of Appeals was entered on December
22, 1994.

An extension of time to file this Petition was granted

by Justice Leonard Russon on January 23, 1995 and extended the
time for filing until February 2, 1995.

This Court has

jurisdiction over the granting or denying of this Petition for
Certiorari pursuant to Section 78-2-2(5), U.C.A.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The sole purpose of this litigation was to divide and
distribute property acquired during the marriage of the parties.
A Decree of Divorce had previously been entered.

Several issues

were raised by the Defendant in the Court of Appeals as to his
claim that the lower court had improperly distributed the assets
of the parties because of improper calculations and use of
erroneous evidence.

The plaintiff filed a cross appeal asserting

numerous claims of error on the part of the trial court as to both
the distribution of property, visitation, and support of the
parties ' children.
Course of Proceedings and Statement of Facts
The litigation in the lower court was extensive and required
approximatey five days of trial during the summer of 1992.

Judge

Wilkinson was required to rule on many issues concerning the
custody and visitation of children, alimony, distribution of
assets, and requests for contempt of court.

The complexity of

this divorce action is best illustrated by the over thirty pages
of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which were required to
be entered.
On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, Defendant contended
that the lower court had erred as to four specific distributions
of property.

On cross appeal, Plaintiff raised ten claimed errors

as to the lower court's decision.
The decision of the Court of Appeals essentially ruled in
favor of the defendant as to two of the four issues and in favor
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of Plaintiff as to one of her claimed errors.
The sole basis for this Petition of Certiorari concerns
Defendant's second contention of error raised before the Court of
Appeals concerning a debt incurred by the defendant to his mother.
In order to fully understand the decision of the Court of Appeals
and the reasons for requesting certiorari, it is necessary to
briefly review the facts surrounding this claimed error.
Defendant is a successful real estate broker and developer.
During the course of their marriage, it was necessary for
Defendant to borrow money from his mother Isabell Coats in order
to finance a real estate development project.

Defendant

maintained that he had borrowed approximatey $400,000 from his
mother and that this was therefore a legitimate debt that had to
be considered before dividing the property with the plaintiff.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, initially took the position
that there was no legitimate debt owed by Defendant and that the
entire transaction was manufactured after the divorce proceedings
began.

For example, during the cross examination of Isabell Coats

by Plaintiff's attorney, assertions were made repeatedly that the
promissory note executed by the defendant to his mother was not
legitimate and was manufactured prior to the commencement of the
trial.

(Tr.

988-90).

The note, Exhibit 50, was dated January

26, 1990 and provided that a maximum of $400,000 could be drawn by
the defendant after the note's execution.

Isabell Coats

emphatically stated that the promissory note was a bona fide loan
upon which she expected payment.

She maintained that she obtained

money for the loan by borrowing on her own Kidder-Peabody margin
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account.

(Tr.

980-87).

Throughout the first few days of trial, Plaintiff refused to
recognize any debt owing to Isabell Coats.
Plaintiff's Exhibits 6, 8, 13, and 31.

See, for example,

On the other hand, even

Plaintiff's accountant acknowledged that he was aware of
Defendant's $400,000 claim concerning the note to Isabell Coats
and acknowledged that if there was such a valid note, then
Defendant should be given a liability deduction on his side of the
accounting.

(Tr.

624). In addition, Plaintiff's witness, David

Evans, testified that he had also learned of the lien of Isabell
Coats for $400,000 and that in fact, a title search on a property
owned by Mr. Coats revealed a $400,000 trust deed note.
1084; Ex.

(Tr.

57). Defendant's balance sheets prepared prior to his

mother's testimony, consistently recognized a debt of $401,000
together with accrued interest of $10,025.

(Defendant's Ex.

58

and 59).
The crux of the appeal and this Petition for Certiorari
concerns the testimony of Isabell Coats herself.

On direct

examinaton, Isabell Coats testified as to the existence of the
agreement between herself and her son.

Exhibit 50 contained the

note as well as various letters and other documents attached to
the note showing that draws had been made against it.
of these documents amounted to $270,000.

The total

Isabell Coats never

testified as to the exact amount that was drawn upon the $400,000
note.

The following testimony given by Mrs. Coats on direct

examination illustrates the ambiguity in her testimony:
A. However it was an open-ended note.
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Q. You did not disburse money out at all with that?
A. The money was disbursed in increments from my Kidder
margin account as necessary for things in the
development,
Q. Now, the need for the note are copies of several
letters, can you tell us what those are?
A. This is what I was talking about,
Q. Are these letters copies of letters that were written by
you?
A. Yes.
Q. And they are written to Fred A,
Peabody?
A. Yes.

Moreton at Kidder-

He's my brother.

Q. You typically deal through him in relation to your
accounts?
A. Yes.
Q. Were these written at or about the time that you g o t —
the dates on these letters?
A. These letters are dated, as far as I know, exactly. I
would sometimes telephone, and then he would do it and I
followed up with the letters; but usually it was written
in anticipation.
Q. But these represent draws against that note,
$400,000?
A. Yes.
(Tr. 981-82).

(Emphasis added).

There is nothing in Isabell Coats1 testimony which states or
inferes that Exhibit 50 and the accompanying documents constituted
the entire amount of the draws.
Apparently, after listening to the testimony of Isabell
Coats, Plaintiff and her attorney decided to abandon the claim
that no valid debt existed and instead began to assert in various
exhibits that the actual debt owing was only $270,000—the total
-5-

of the written authorizations attached to the promissory note
contained in Exhibit 50.

See Plaintiff's Exhibits 65, 90, 91, 97

and 98.
Isabell Coats was called at the beginning of the trial
because she lived in California and was unavailable for the rest
of the trial.

After Plaintiff changed her position of no debt to

a limited debt, Defendant offered three forms of evidence to
support the entire $400,000 contention.

First, Defendant himself

testified to the existence of a valid loan agreement as contained
in Exhibit 50.

As to the exact amount, however, he stated he did

not know and that he relied entirely upon his own accountants who
maintained his records for that information.

(Tr.

1056-57).

Second, Defendant called Melody J. Rasmussen, a CPA assisting
Defendant in his case, who testified as to the loan between
Defendant and his mother.

Plaintiff's attorney objected to this

testimony on the grounds that such testimony would contradict the
direct testimony of Mrs. Coats as to the amount of the loan and
also directly contradict Exhibit 50 containing the note and
various letters written concerning the note.
Court overruled the objection.

(Tr.

1376-77).

The

(Id.).

Third, through the testimony of Ms. Rasmussen, Exhibit 72 was
admitted into evidence.

This Exhibit contained numerous letters

and accountings from Mrs. Coats together with an accounting of the
various draws made by the defendant.

In addition, copies of

checks which Defendant claimed to be interest payments on the
loans were contained in this Exhibit.

Ms. Rasmussen testified

that as of April 30, 1992 there was $401,000 owing on the note and
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$10,025 of accrued interest owing.

(Tr.

1379).

In closing argument, Plaintiff's attorney contended that the
testimony of Ms. Rasmussen and the accompanying exhibits were in
contradiction to the direct testimony of Isabell Coats who he
claimed stated that the entire amount of the loan was $270,000 as
represented by Exhibit 50.

Plaintifffs attorney stated in

closing argument:
...That Mrs. Coats testified to these letters and
"all the evidence of all the loans I made" and the very
first loan she said she made was a March, 1990 loan and
that's when they began."
And then we go through there and those add up, Your
Honor, to $270,000. And the note doesn't say $400,000,
it says up to $400,000. (Tr. 1244-46).
Judge Wilkinson accepted the position argued by Plaintiff and
concluded that Mrs. Coats had in fact testified that the documents
attached to Exhibit 50 constituted the entire debt and that the
testimony of the accountant and her exhibits were in direct
contradiction.

The Court entered Finding No. 14(k)(2) which

states the following:
The Court finds the liability owed to Isabell Coats
to be $270,000. There was conflicting evidence
presented to the Court as to the amount of liability
owed to Isabell Coats. Isabell Coats testified to the
Court and stated that Defendant's Exhibit D-50 showed
all of the obligations owed by the defendant to her.
The total amount of the notes which make up Defendant's
Exhibit D-50 is $270,000. While the defendant's
certified public accountant testified on the amount of
the notes and stated that the outstanding balance was
$411,025, that amount was never verified by Isabell
Coats, and the Court cannot reconcile in its mind the
difference between the amount testified to by the
certified public accountant and the amount testified to
by Defendant's mother who is the creditor of the note.
The Court finds that the most credible evidence is
that of the creditor and that if she were owed more than
$270,000 that testimony certainly would have been
-7-

presented to the Court. That is especially true in the
mind of the Court when the defendant placed Isabell
Coats on the stand out of time to be able to get her
testimony in regarding the liability and amount owed to
her by the defendant. Accordingly, the Court
specifically finds that the preponderance of the
evidence is that the outstanding note owed to Isabell
Coats is the amount of $270,000. (Findings of Fact, pp.
17-18).
(Emphasis added).
It is apparent that the lower court rejected Defendant's
claim of $411,000 on the assumption that the testimony of Isabell
Coats directly contradicted the testimony of the accountant.

As

noted earlier, however, a review of the transcript of Isabell
Coats' testimony shows no such contradiction.

Isabell Coats never

stated the amount that was owing to her and never stated that all
of the letters attached to the promissory note contained in
Exhibit 50, were the entire sum due and owing to her by her son.
It is clear from reading the entire transcript that Isabell Coats
did not state any figure whatsoever as to the amount owing.
Thus, since Isabell Coats did not state any amount that had
been drawn on the note, the only relevant evidence before the
trial court was the testimony of Ms. Rasmussen and the
accompanying exhibit showing Defendant's version of the amount
that had been borrowed from his mother.

Defendant, as the debtor,

was certainly entitled to present his evidence as to what he
claimed was owing to his mother.
Defendant's evidence was consistent that a note was executed
by Defendant to his mother for up to $400,000, that various draws
were made by his mother from her Kidder-Peabody account throughout
the two-year period in order to finance Defendant's building
projects.

The interest payments made by the defendant as
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evidenced by checks in the record, were completely consistent with
the amounts claimed to be owing both by the accountant and by the
documents contained in Exhibit 72.
On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, Defendant claimed
that the lower court had erred in concluding that the total debt
owing was $270,000 and in not recognizing the legitimate amount of
over $400,000,

(Appellant's Opening Brief, pp.

Defendant's Reply Brief, pp.

9-13).

19-26;

Defendant cited the Court of

Appeals to a line of cases which hold that the testimony of a
witness who does not remember whether a certain event took place
does not contradict the positive testimony of another witness that
such event or conversation in fact did take place.
David, 439 P.2d 673 (Nev.

McClellan v.

1968); see also, Comment, Note-

Comparative Value of Positive and Negative Testimony, 98 A.L.R.
161.

(Defendant's Reply Brief, p. 12).
In the Court of Appeals, Plaintiff argued that the lower

court was correct in concluding the $270,000 amount since the
lower court had wide discretion in judging the credibility of the
witnesses.

Plaintiff quoted extensively from the transcript

concerning the cross examination of Isabell Coats but was unable
to cite any specific reference to the amount owing.
Thus, the position of the two parties before the Court of
Appeals was well drawn.

Defendant contended that the factual

finding was not based upon the evidence and was therefore clearly
erroneous.

He maintained that his mother had never stated the

amount owing on the note and therefore there was no contradiction
of testimony in the positive testimony that he offered.
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Plaintiff, on the other hand, maintained that Isabell Coats had
specifically stated an amount of $270,000 owing and that any
testimony by Defendant's accountants would be in direct
contradiction of that testimony and therefore should be left to
the judge to decide the credibility.
The decision of the Court of Appeals found in favor of the
defendant as to his claim that his mother had not testified as to
any specific amount of the debt.

Even so, however, the court

sustained the judgment on the basis that the testimony of Ms.
Rasmussen and the accompanying documents did not have an adequate
foundation and was based upon second-hand information of which Ms.
Rasmussen could not establish its reliability.

The relevant

decision of the Court of Appeals as to this issue is as follows:
Mr. Coats also asserts that the trial court wrongly
determined that a debt owed to his mother had a balance
of $270,000 in principal, rather than approximately
$400,000, as claimed by him. The evidence of this issue
is problematic. Mr. Coats1 mother testified about a
note payable to her and her husband, signed by Mr.
Coats, for a principal sum of up to $400,000. She
further testified that advances on the notes were
arranged by either a letter or a telephone call followed
by a letter, to her brother, who worked at KidderPeabody. The advances were facilitiated by loans
against Mrs. Coats1 own account at Kidder-Peabody. The
letters which Mrs. Coats actually verified during her
testimony referred to various advances totaling
$270,000. She did not, however, testify that these
letters either did or did not represent all advances
under the note to Mr. Coats. Subsequently, Mr. Coats
called a CPA, Melody Rasmussen, who testified over Mrs.
Coats1 objections, to amounts Mr. Coats owed his mother.
Ms. Rasmussen referred to Defendant's Exhibit 72, which
included her handwritten computations of the debt and
copies of letters purportedly signed by Mrs. Coats and
copies of checks, purportedly for interest payments on
the note. Ms. Rasmussenfs testimony, however, was based
on what she was told by another accountant and the
content of the letters. She could not verify that
advances had actually been made, nor their amounts.

-10-

As a result of the nature of this evidence, the
trial court had to sort out the testimony of Mr. and
Mrs. Coats, which verified that the loan did exist, and
that of Ms. Rasmussen, which lacked an adequate
foundation for the actual figures. Contrary to the
assertions of Ms. Coats, it appears that the trial court
accorded considerable credibility to Mrs. Coats, by
finding that the debt existed and also including in the
balance due all the testimony presented by Mrs. Coats,
which was limited to $270,000. The trial court
discounted the testimony of Ms. Rasmussen because it was
based solely on second-hand information—she could not
establish its reliability. The trial court has
considerable discretion in assessing conflicting
evidence and may give weight to the testimony as it
deems appropriate. Weston v. Weston, 773 P.2d 408,
410 (Utah App. 1989). In this instance, we find no
abuse of discretion by the trial court in determining
that the principal balance on this debt was $270,000.
(Slip Opinion, pp. 2-3).
Thus, the Court of Appeals essentially ruled that the lower
court had erred in concluding that "Isabell Coats testified to the
Court and stated that Defendant's Exhibit D-50 showed all of the
obligation owed by the defendant to her." [Finding No.

14(k)(2)].

The Court of Appeals specifically held that "she did not, however,
testify that these letters either did or did not represent all
advances under the note to Mr. Coats." Instead of vacating the
Finding and ordering reversal or remand, however, the Court of
Appeals basically ruled that the testimony of Ms. Rasmussen lacked
legal foundation and was therefore incompetent to consider on its
own merit.

This ruling was made even though (1) Plaintiff had

never objected to the testimony of Ms. Rasmussen on the basis of
lack of foundation or reliability, and (2) Plaintiff never cross
appealed or raised this issue during any of the appellate
proceedings.
Defendant, therefore, is seeking review of the Court of
Appeals' decision to correct this erroneous application of
-11-

appellate principles which have been discarded by the Court of
Appeals.
REASONS FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT
The decision by the panel of the Court of Appeals has clearly
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings and has distorted the requirements of appellate review
by concluding that the Findings of the lower court were erroneous
but nevertheless affirming the decision based on grounds not
properly preserved in the trial or appeal.
A review of the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals
clearly shows that the appellate panel accepted the argument by
Defendant that his mother's testimony did not specifically contain
any amount that was owing to her by the defendant.

Because the

lower court erroneously assumed (without the benefit of a
transcript) that Isabell Coats1 testimony directly contradicted
the testimony of the accountant and other documents, the Court
based its entire award on this alleged contradiction.

A review of

the transcript by the Court of Appeals, however, showed that this
assumption was wrong and that "she did not, however, testify that
these letters either did or did not represent all advances under
the note to Mr. Coats." (Slip Opinion, p. 3 ) .
It is fundamental that a trial court's findings of fact are
clearly erroneous if they are so lacking in support as to be
against the clear weight of the evidence.
P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989).

Dole v. Bradley, 784

Moreover, findings are clearly

erroneous if an appellate court reaches the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.
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Sorensen v. Kennecott

Utah Copper Corp., 873 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah App.
1.

1994).

The Court of Appeals Should Have Reversed
the Judgment or, at a Minimum, Remanded for
Further Proceedings.

When a critical finding of fact is deemed to be clearly
erroneous the accepted and usual course of appellate judicial
proceeding is to reverse the judgment based upon such finding or
remand to the lower court for the correction of such finding.

As

to the first alternative of reversal, the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma noted that when a district court as part of its judgment
makes separate findings of fact which are found insufficient to
support judgment, the decision is contrary to law and must be
reversed.

Cook v. Oklahoma Board of Public Affairs, 736 P.2d

140 (Okla. 1987).

Moreover, where the conclusions reached by the

trial court are against the clear weight of the evidence, an
appellate court has the right and duty to set aside the judgment
of the trial court and render the judgment which should have been
rendered originally.

Taton v. McCalsin, 417 P.2d 316 (Okla.

1966).
The very panel which rendered this decision recognized this
overriding appellate principle in the first portion of its
decision.

It found that the lower court had erred in concluding

that promissory notes written from a Kidder-Peabody account after
the divorce was final could not be deemed marital property and
therefore reversed and vacated the award made by the lower court
on this erroneous assumption.

In other cases, the Court of

Appeals has also vacated judgments that were based upon erroneous
factual findings.

Slattery v. Covey & Co., Inc., 857 P.2d
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243 (Utah App. 1993) .
A second alternative remedy that the Court of Appeals could
have adopted was to remand the issue of the Isabell Coats note
back to the trial court for further proceedings.

The trial court

could then examine all the evidence presented at trial after the
erroneous assumption had been eliminated from the decision making
process.

The Court could then make new findings based upon the

credible evidence to determine whether the full amount of the debt
as claimed by the defendant should be recognized.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals did remand to the
lower court the question of whether a $4,300 credit had been
properly given to the defendant.

It certainly could also have

remanded the issue of over $140,000 at the same time.

When

findings are deficient because they fail to evaluate critical
factors, it is appropriate to remand for further proceedings.
Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73 (Utah App.

1991).

The Court of Appeals erred in failing to either vacate the
judgment in its entirety or in failing to remand for further
proceedings.
2.

The Court of Appeals Departed from Accepted
and Usual Course of Judicial Proceedings by Basing
Its Decision on Factors That Were Not Properly
Preserved Below or Raised on Appeal.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment even though it
found that Isabell Coats had not contradicted the testimony of the
accountant.

The Court of Appeals concluded that the accountant's

testimony "lacked an adequate foundation for the actual figures."
It further concluded that the accountant's testimony was based
solely on second-hand information and therefore was not reliable.
-14-

It is fundamental that it is not the function of an appellate
court to make findings of fact because it does not have the
advantage of seeing and hearing a witness testify.
Dalton, 598 P. 2d 1336 (Utah 1979).

Rucker v.

Thus, the Court of Appeals

has no authority of its own to make its own determination as to
the credibility of the various pieces of evidence offered in this
matter.
The two bases used by the Court of Appeals to categorically
reject the affirmative evidence of the debt presented by the
accountant of Mr. Coats was that such testimony did not have
sufficient foundation nor was it reliable.

Neither of these

grounds, however, was raised in the court below.
The only objection made by Plaintiff's counsel concerning Ms.
Rasmussen's testimony concerned the same argument made on appeal:
namely, that her testimony could not be used to contradict the
definite testimony of the creditor and therefore was not the best
evidence of the debt.

Plaintiff's counsel objected to Ms.

Rasmussen's testimony as follows:
MR. PETERSON: I would object and move the testimony be
stricken, and object to this witness' testifying in any
regard as to amounts currently due and owing.
Defendant's Exhibit No. 50 has been admitted before this
Court by the creditor Isabell Coats, and the defendant's
Exhibit No. 50 speaks precisely to amounts owed, and
this witness has been called. It appears to me, to
contradict the defendant's Exhibit No. 50 which is the
exhibit evidencing debt owed to Isabell Coats. And all
evidence offered by this witness would be clearly in
contradiction to Defendant's Exhibit No. 50. (Tr.
1376).
In a later dialogue between the Court and Plaintiff's
counsel, the following occurred:
THE COURT: No. No. The Court's ready to rule.
-15-

The Court

is going to allow her to testify.
MR, PETERSON: Your Honor, I want to except to the
Court's rulings specifically for the purpose of the
record. I want to identify to the Court—I need to
identify for the record my exception. Defendant's
Exhibit No. 50 shows a liability of $270,000.
Defendant's Exhibit No. 5 0 —
THE COURT: Counsel, counsel, didn't you argue that on
your opening?
MR. PETERSON: No, I didn't.
THE COURT: You said that the witness had already
testified under Exhibit No. 50 as to the amount which is
due and owing.
MR. PETERSON: Correct. This witness is testifying to
something that isn't in evidence before the Court. She
doesn't have—just because she's a CPA doesn't give her
authority to testify as to amounts owing on a debt that
doesn't exist.
THE COURT: Counsel, I've overruled you, and the Court
will make a determination as to whether that testimony
is relevant or wheter it is admissible. Let's go.
Counsel. (Tr. 1376-77).
It is apparent that no objection was made that the testimony
related by Ms. Rasmussen lacked foundation or was unreliable.
Instead, Plaintff's counsel relied solely upon the theory that
Isabell Coats' testimony together with Exhibit 50 was the best
evidence of the debt and therefore could not be contradicted by
lesser evidence.

Since this assumption of counsel was incorrect,

and since the Court of Appeals specifically found that neither
Isabell Coats nor Exhibit 50 conclusively established the amount
of the debt, the objection that was made is without legal basis.
It is fundamental that in order to preserve a contention of
error on appeal a party claiming error in the admission of
evidence must raise the objection to the trial court in clear
and concise terms and in a timely fashion calculated to obtain a
-16-

ruling.
1984).

Barson v. E.R.

Squibb & Som

u

682 P.2d 832 (Utah

This Court stated the purpose of this rule as follows:

By making use of the rule, counsel gives the trial
court the opportunity to conduct the trial without using
the tainted evidence, and thus avoid possible reversal
and a new trial. Furthermore, the rule is practically
one of necessity if litigation is ever to be brought to
an end. State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942, 947
(Utah 1982) .
A review of the transcript of Ms. Rasmussen's testimony shows
without question that no specific or timely objections were ever
made concerning any claimed lack of foundation or unreliability of
such testimony.

Rather, Ms. Rasmussen testified based upon

undisputed documents of business records of both Mr. Coats and his
mother and gave her opinion of the resulting debt without any
further objection than that which has been originally cited
supra.

Thus, because Plaintiff did not properly and timely

object to Ms. Rasmussen's testimony as to either foundation or to
reliability, those objections were waived.
In addition, the Court of Appeals was judicially precluded
from affirming the judgment based upon an alleged lack of
foundation or alleged unreliability of the testimony of Ms.
Rasmussen.

There is nothing in the findings of the lower court to

indicate that the Court concluded Ms. Rasmussen's testimony lacked
foundation or was unreliable on its own face.

Rather, the

findings indicate that the Court considered her testimony in light
of the direct testimony of the creditor, he found that Isabell
Coats was the most convincing.
Even if it is assumed arguendo that proper objections had
been made to Melody Rasmussen's testimony on the basis of lack of
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foundation or reliability, there was no attempt made by Plaintiff
to preserve that issue on appeal.

Although Plaintiff cross

appealed some ten separate issues, no effort was made to
alternatively argue that the testimony of Melody Rasmussen and the
exhibit she introduced was inadmissible for reasons other than a
contradiction of Isabell Coats1 testimony.
It is basic appellate law that when a party fails to brief an
issue that point is waived as to any appellate relief.
State Farm Auto Ins., 809 P.2d 746 (Utah App.

1991).

Pixon v.
In

Northwest Otolaryngology Associates v. Mobilease, 786 S.W.2d 399
(Tex.

App.

1990) a party objected to the use of an expert

witness that had not previously been designated in the discovery.
However, that party failed to appeal the overruling of the
objection.

The court held that even though the objection had been

made timely, and even though the objection was proper and the
court erred, the issue could not be considered on appeal since it
had not been raised by the party.
Comis, 845 P.2d 753 (N.M.

See also, City of Sante Fe v.

1992) (although proper objection had

been made to hearsay video tape, City abandoned the hearsay issue
by failing to brief it on appeal).

Because this issue was never

raised by Plaintiff it was never argued by the parties either in
writing or orally.
In summary, a reading of Finding No. 14(k) (2) clearly
indicates that the lower court's decision in awarding the $270,000
debt instead of the $411,000 debt was based solely upon the
Court's erroneous conclusion that Mrs. Coats has stated a definite
amount of $270,000.

The Court specifically said, "the Court

-18-

cannot reconcile in its mind the difference between the amount
testified to by the Certified Public Accountant and the amount
testified to by Defendant's mother, who is the creditor on the
note."
The Court of Appeals, however, rather than recognizing this
fundamental flaw in the Findings took it upon itself to conclude
that the testimony of Ms, Rasmussen lacked foundation and was
unreliable and that the lower court had rejected it for these
reasons.

This explanation is neither contained in the opinion of

the lower court nor is it justified since there were no objections
raised in the lower court nor were the issues preserved on appeal.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, formulated its own conclusion in
order to salvage the judgment based upon the erroneous finding by
the lower court.
This Court should exercise its supervisory power to prevent
this fundamental departure of appellate review and proper
appellate judicial proceedings.

This Court should accept

certiorari to review the propriety of the remedy formulated by the
Court of Appeals.
DATED this 2nd day of February, 1995.

Craig ^J

Cook

Attorney for Petitioner
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies of the
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to Craig M. Peterson, Attorney for
Respondent, 426 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 this
-19-

2nd day of February, 1995,

J2
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GREENWOOD, Judge:
Kathryn Tuck Coats and Peter M. Coats both appeal from ths
trial court's decree of divorce. The issues raised on appeal
mainly concern the trial court's orders regarding the parties'
financial relationships. We reverse and remand in part and
affirm in part.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because trial courts have considerable discretion in
determining alimony and property distribution in divorce cases,
the court's findings will be overturned only when a clear abuse
of discretion has been demonstrated. Bincrham v, Binahaji, 872
P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah App. 1994). Appellate courts will not
overturn the trial court's factual findings in a divorce case
unless clearly erroneous. Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 259
(Utah App. 1993). In reviewing the trial court's factual'
findings, due regard will be given to the trial court's

(W

opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses.
Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305, 1307-08 (Utah App. 1991).

Peterson v.

ANALYSIS
The trial court determined that a Kidder-Peabody account in
Mr. Coats's name, the corpus of which consisted of blue chip
stock inherited from Mr. Coats's grandparents, was not part of
the marital estate, but belonged to Mr. Coats alone. Ms. Coats
argued vigorously at trial that the account should have been
characterized as marital property, but does not now appeal that
finding. However, the trial court further determined that
receivables arising from loans made to third parties from the
Kidder-Peabody account were marital property and subject to
distribution. The trial court valued these receivables, referred
to as bridge loans, at $116,192. Mr. Coats argues that the trial
court erred in finding the receivables to be marital property.
We agree. A mere change of a spouse's separate property does not
in and of itself make the property part of the marital estate;
rather the issue is whether the change in form signals a loss of
identity of the funds as a separate account. Burt v. Burt, 799
P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah App. 1990). It is undisputed that the
bridge loans were made using funds from the Kidder-Peabody
account and that the loans were payable to Mr. Coats, with a
notation that they were for the Kidder-Peabody account. Ms.
Coats argues that the notes should be considered marital property
because they were executed prior to trial on this issue, albeit
after a divorce had been granted in bifurcated proceedings. We
do not dispute that ordinarily, property should be valued as of
the time of trial. However, the fact that the parties were
divorced and no longer living together, supports the conclusion
that the property had not been commingled with marital property
so as to lose its character as separate property. Given the
trial court's uncontested finding that the Kidder-Peabody account
was separate rather than marital property, it follows that the
bridge loans made from that account, absent any evidence of
commingling, is also separate property of Mr. Coats. The record
lacks any evidence of commingling or other support for the trial
court's finding that these notes representing the bridge loans
were marital property. That finding must therefore be reversed.
Mr. Coats also asserts that the trial court wrongly
determined that a debt owed to his mother had a balance of
$270,000 in principal, rather than approximately $400,000, as
claimed by him. The evidence on this issue is problematic. Mr.
Coats's mother testified about a note payable to her and her
husband, signed by Mr. Coats, for a principal sum of up to
$400,000. She further testified that advances on the note were
arranged by either a letter or a telephone call followed by a
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letter, to her brother, who worked at Kidder-Peabody. The
advances were facilitated by loans against Mrs. coats's own
account at Kidder-Feabody. The letters which Mrs, Coats actually
verified during her testimony referred to various advances
totalling $270,000. She did not, however, testify that these
letters either did or did not represent all advances under the
note to Mr. Coats, Subsequently, Mr. Coats called a CPA, Melody
Rasmussen, who testified over Ms. Coats'$ objection, to amounts
Mr. Coats owed his mother. Ms, Rasmussen referred to Defendant's
Exhibit 72, which included her handwritten computations of the
debt and copies of letters purportedly signed by Mrs. Coats and
copies of checks, purportedly for interest payments on the note*
Ms. Rasmussen's testimony, however, was based on what she was
told by another accountant and the content of the letters. She
could not verify that advances had actually been made, nor their
amounts• As a result of the nature of this evidence, the trial
court had to sort out the testimony of Mr. Coats and Mrs. Coats,
which verified that the loan did exist, and that of Ms.
Rasmussen, which lacked an adequate foundation for the actual
figures. Contrary to the assertions of Ms. coats, it appears
that the trial court accorded considerable credibility to Mrs.
Coats, by finding that the debt existed and also including in the
balance due all of the testimony presented by Mrs* Coats, which
was limited to $270,000. The trial court discounted the
testimony of Ms. Rasmussen because it was based solely on second
hand information—she could not establish its reliability. The
trial court has considerable discretion in assessing conflicting
evidence and may give weight to the testimony as it deems
appropriate. Weston v. Weston. 773 P.2d 408, 410 (Utah App.
1989)• In this instance, we find no abuse of discretion by the
trial court in determining that the principal balance on this
debt was $270,000.
Mr. Coats also appeals the trial court's decision adding
$57,000 to the value of the Brandon Canyon property* He
complains that the trial court admitted that it was an arbitrary
valuation and that this court should therefore reverse. We have
examined the evidence presented to the trial court and believe
that it supports various approaches to the allocation of the
$57,000 in sales proceeds. We will not remand to allow a party a
second chance to do a better job of mustering its evidence. The
$57,000 amount is within the range possible under the evidence.
We therefore affirm on this issue.
Mr. Coats also claims the trial
account for the $4,300 credit he was
boat, which Ms. Coats sold. We find
this point and therefore direct that
on remand.

o:>rt^R2-CA
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court did not properly
entitled to for the family
the record to be unclear on
the trial court clarify it

Ms. Coats asserts on appeal that the trial court erred by
awarding her alimony to terminate in ten years, arguing that it
should have awarded permanent alimony. We agree. The findings
of fact justify temporary alimony because of Ms. Coats's
relatively young age and her potential ability to earn an income.
However, it is an abuse of discretion to terminate alimony where,
because of a lack of job skills and experience, the recipient
spouse is not likely to be able to support her or himself at the
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. Olson v. Olson,
704 P.2d 564, 567 (Utah 1985). In order to award terminable
alimony a trial court must articulate a basis for so doing that
is not based merely on speculation about future income. Fullmer
v. Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942, 951 (Utah App. 1933) ; Andersen v.
Andersen, 757 P.2d 476, 478-79 (Utah App. 1988); Petersen v.
Petersen, 737 P.2d 237, 243 n.5 (Utah App. 1987). Given the
continuing jurisdiction of the courts in domestic cases, alimony
can easily be modified when justified by changed circumstances.
Olson, 704 P.2d at 567; Petersen, 737 P.2d at 243 n.5.
Considering the length of the marriage and Ms. Coats's employment
options at the time of trial, the trial court abused its
discretion by awarding temporary rather than permanent alimony.
See also Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah App. 1992)
(upholding permanent alimony after seven year marriage).
Mr. Coats has conceded on the issue of tax exemptions. We
have determined that the other issues asserted by Ms. Coats on
appeal are without merit and therefore we do not address them.
State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888-89 (Utah 1989) (stating that
appellate courts "need not analyze and address in writing each
and every argument, issue, or claim raised").
CONCLUSION
We determine that the trial court abused its discretion in
its characterization of the receivables for the bridge loans as
marital property. The receivables are separate property to be
awarded to Mr. Coats. The trial court also abused its discretion
in failing to award permanent alimony to Ms. Coats. The trial
court acted within its discretion in determining that the balance
due on the debt owed by Mr. Coats to his mother was $270,000. We
therefore reverse and remand to the trial court on the issues of
the bridge loan receivables and alimony. We also direct the
court to clarify the $4,300 credit to Mr. Coats for the boat sale
and to make any other financial adjustments, including possible
changes in the amount of alimony awarded, necessitated by this
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opinion. Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 955 (Utah App. 1988);
Smith v. Smith, 738 P.2d 655, 658 (Utah App. 1987).

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
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Craig M. Peterson (2579)
Attorney for Plaintiff
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
TY, STATE i
ooOoo
KATHRYN TUCK COATS,

H

——
SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE OF DIVORCE
AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

*oUGafc7/

PETER M. COATS,
Cc/vv\
Civil No. 904904876 DA
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendant.

ooOoo—
The above matter came before \h** Court
and continued thereafte
Honorable

Homer F

>

1992

r I:i II!

Wilkinson,

presiding

for trial.

Plaintiff was present in person and represented by counsel, Craig
M. Peterson.

Tin' IVIiMn'ant, wan pi t»si "iii! in person

by counsel, Melvin G. Larew.

The Court having heretofore entered

its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, does now enter its
Supplemental Deci t iie 11 ( P > u i»i <'<» .i . If)1! ows i

1

SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE OF DIVORCE
1.

The Plaintiff is awarded the p e r m a n e n t c a r e , c u s t o d y

and control of

. children • : f the p a r t i e s .

2.

T h e Defendant is awarded r i g h t s of v i s i t a t i o n w i t h

J-hip i i nni children w h i c h shall lie .is Isillnws:
a.
preferable.

Every other Saturday 01: S u n d a y , w h i c h e v e r i s

H o w e v e r , unless there is a d i f f e r e n t election by t h e

parties, the <

p iii.

without supervision.
b.
noon until

in

^ m

O n e d a y during t h e a l t e r n a t e w e e k from 3 2:00
I n t h e evening o n W e d n e s d a y evening o r a n

alternate evening if t h e parties e l e c t .
c.

Wh :i 1 e the ::::h i Idren i: eiia i n i n U ta h ciii :i r i rig the

summer, the Defendant will have every other red letter holiday from
10:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. commencing with July 4
d.

Wliii:"in

l 11 ,
'
" children

i. el, iiux n

] 9 92
t o V irgi n I a , the

Defendant may travel to Virginia and visit with the children
anytime he is in the area during the daytime until 7:00 p.m. in the
evening. If the chile.

to the Salt Lake area while they are

residing in Virginia, then the Defendant shall have the additional
right to visit with the children during the daytime while they are
in Salt Lake City, and he will have to request that visitation.

2

e.

There will not be any overnight visitation nor

will the children be required to come from Virginia to Utah to
visit for six months.

During that time, each of the parties are

expected to receive counseling.
aftei

Following the counseling, and

Defendant will have the ri gh !:::: to visit with

the children depending upon his income ability by bringing the
children to Utah for one-half of the Christmas holiday, two weeks
i ri the si urine

.g 1 993 a nd expai ided summer visits

weeks beginning in 1994.

In addition, if there is an additional

vacation for the children from school such as Spring vacation or
Easter vacation, then the Defendant may bring the children to Utah
for visitation during one-half of that vacation time. Finally, the
Defendant

\ ; :i ] ] fc = • • i 3 1 ov < = • I t :: • • xerci se

Tl lanksgi vi rig

>: J i t h

children in Utah during every other year.
3.

The Plaintiff shall replace Mr. Tom Harrison with

another counselor for the children.

Both parties sh .

counseling to assist them with their problems

nnmence

identified in

paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the Findings of Fact entered herein.,
counseling .shall commence within thirty (30) days of June 1"
4.

Such
I'l'i,.!.

The Defendant is ordered to pay to the Plaintiff the

sum of $1 891 GO per month as child support to be pajm bu uhau

n

will be received by the Plaintiff one-half on or before the 5th day
of each month and one-half on or before the twentieth day of each
3

t::l i e

month.

Said child support shall be paid until such time as the

minor children reach the age of majority
liciie veil bllid,! I, ucuui

I jLei

^ graduate from high

SUM

enl sliai I hi.1 m a d e

through the clerk of the Court.
5.

The Defendant shall maintain a policy of health and

accident insurance for the benefit of the minor children of the
parties.

All uninsured medical expenses shall be paid on a ratio

of ei ght percent (8%) hy the Pi a i lit i f f a nd n il nety b; «.i ::> p e r c e n !:::: ( 92%)
by the Defendant, provided, however, that the Plaintiff shall pay
all routine and ordinary medical expenses consisting of office
:i:a I: :il JTI s ai id o t h e r • Drdi rial: y medicaJ expenses .

visits .,
6.

The Defendant shall pay to the Plaitniff alimony in

the amount of $2,000.00 per month to be paid so that it shall be
recieved by the Plaintiff not later than one-half on the fifth and
one-half on the twentieth days of each month, such payments to be
made through the clerk of the Court.

Payments s h a M

hi. ""v;» I1"3 f o r

ten years from the date of commencement of payment of child support
and alimony pursuant to this Order, which date of
shall

In

alimony

commencement

mi

I I., I » / .

7.

The Defendant may make a single lump sum payment of

in

the

satisfaction <

amount

of

$120,000.00

as

full

and

complete

c:i owing to the Plaintiff by the

4

Defendant.

If the Defendant elects to make a lump sum payment of

alimony, that payment shall be made on or before Agusut 16, 1 9 9 2 .
8.
insurance

"'

shall

naming

the

minor

beneficiaries thereunder.

continue

children

and

maintain
the

Plaintifl

li fe
as

Life insurance shall continue in full

force and effect in the amounts which have been maintained during
the p a r t i e s 7 marriage. At such time as the Defendant no longer has
obligat i on t : p. ;; 3 ] i m< : nj

ti • a mount • :i)f J I f e i nsiii: ance may 1 •

decreased so that the only continuing obligation for life insurance
will

support obligation

chile

.

leficiai -•

-h-*- time, the minor
uder tx

po] I c} u i t: I:i the

Plaintiff to receive beneficial interest in behalf of the minor
children.
9,

The marital estae shall be awarded to the parties

pursuant to Plaintiff's Exhibit "P-91" which is attached hereto and
made a pa rt hereof.
to Exhibit "P-911 ""'

Further, all l-nhLltLet

sh-i ' ' * "•* |u",,l J ir\"'i ,I|M|1

equalize the distribution of the marital

estate, Defendant shall pay Plaintiff $144,070.00, which shall be
reduced to judgment.

Specifically, t

-iff is

right, title and interest in and to :....« marital residence at 3 6
Northridge Way, Sandy, Utah, said property being more particularly
describe

5

A l l of L o t #406, P E P P E R W O O D P H A S E IV S U B D I V I S I O N ,
as r e c o r d e d in t h e o f f i c e of t h e Salt L a k e C o u n t y
Recorder.
All

int er e s t

111 l 111

IJe I * i r111 1111

i

p r o p e r t y is q u i e t e d and shall b e of
10.
benefit

•'

i 111

| J11r c e I

M

I

i ea 1

further f o r c e a n d e f f e c t .

T h e r e have been trust a c c o u n t s e s t a b l i s h e d f o r t h e

of t h e c h i l d r e n .

The Plaintiff

has been

ordered

to

r e i m b u r s e t h e c h i l d r e n ' s a c c o u n t s f o r funds that h a v e b e e n b o r r o w e d
from ("hose arrnnnt'
from

the accounts

"In parties run' mil *
of t h e c h i l d r e n ,

s i g n a t u r e of b o t h p a r e n t s f

iniw .HI

except

or agreement

by

furthei

funds

agreement

-h- children

and

- the

funds

2

age of m a j o r i t y .
11.

T h e Defendant was ordered to pay temporary

in this m a t t e r .

support

P u r s u a n t t o t h e laws a n d c a s e s I n t h e state of

U t a h a n d s p e c i f i c a l l y u n d e r Utah C o d e A n n o t a t e d ,

§78-32-10f

Defendant is in cont 2mpt c f the Orde*

the
;

is fined $200.00 and is to be imprisoned in the Salt Lake County
Jail for thirty (30) days for his contempt.
The seii ten; ::IE t ::) j a i l

iiiinil 1 tup < MI KM1

hnulil h e s t a y e d

upon

t h e D e f e n d a n t p a y i n g t h e amounts he has p r e v i o u s l y b e e n o r d e r e d t o
pay b y t h e T e m p o r a r y O r d e r .
or bef

T h e D e f e n d a n t m u s t p a y $ 1 3 , 8 1 0 . 9 7 on
i ddi I.. una 1

,i I ' , II II 'i

J u l y 2 6 , 1992, f o r a total payment of $ 2 7 f 6 2 1 . 9 4 .
6

mi m

IIKI'OIH

The Defendant

bliall

lecei'M"

"redid.. d y a u i s L

L lie iijiiiiuint

owed for any charges made on his credit cards fay the Plaintiff
which have not been charged back to the Plaintiff.

In addition, he

shall receive a credit in the amount of $500.00 for a snow blower
which was

sold

the Plaintiff.

deductions frf
due support.

be

further

:f the Defendant fails to make payment as ordered on

County Ja i ] fc i :: i :i
12.
Peter,

will

L t: f n be, paiii by H I P Defendant for the past

or before July 26, 1991

of

There

;hen he shall report to the Salt Lake
-.- -

til: ,ei: ei n for th Ixt;y ( 30 ) days.

The Plaintiff should write a check from the account

Jr.

to

the Defendant

for

the

amount

of

dividends

deposited to his account.
13.

The Plaintiff is awarded additional judgment against

the Defendant in
attorney's fees.

J

The Plaintiff's request :or expert's fees for

the professionals who have testified in this matter and assisted
the Plaintiff in piepaid L • un
14.
harmless

I IIHI I I.LM"

n . denied

The Defendant shall indemnify and hold the Plaintiff

from any tax liability which may be incurred by the

parties o:r assessed against them for the fil ing of t ax returns for
all prior years, unless additional tax assessment has been caused
by misrepresentation or fraud on the part of the Plaintiff.

7

The Defendant

P awarded one of the minor rlnldren « ' a

depenc

ling his state and federal income

tax returns and

Plaintiff will be awarded

for that purpose.

If t he Plaintiff JLS nc

clii

*\:« of the children
o

^n 52H0 1 e obligated

Defendant and allow him

utilize one or ho*:

notify

r t.v^

the

deductions

for the purpose of filing his statf
15.

The Defendant's request for additional visitation be

16.

A

denied.
permanent

in 1

a .1 r 11.1

111 • 1 11

l-cirtieb i" 11 |. lining them, from talking about each other i.n front of
the children, degrading each other, or taking any action which
would be denigratin

h shal1 be

:iijoined from discussing the proceedings in this case with (or in
front

of)

the

children

or

providing

information or any of the pleadings

them with
this case.

access

to

any

Any action by

either of the parties in violation of this injunction shall be
construed a contempt of Court and punished accordingly.
I"1

I'1 r« i nf i f 1 1

,-tWfiiilpi1 d I >tal judgment against the

Defendant in the amount of $164,070.00.
DATED this

*~f

day of August, 1992.
BY^Hjl? COURT:

?

strict Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed
r cne for
JUDGMEN1

and

SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE <",. DIVORCE AND

ttZK day
in

Melvir. _. Larew, _ _ . , 2sq^7
4190 Highland Drive
tioti/
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah/j34124
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EXHIBIT "A"

COATS V. COATS
StEBXSNSNT OF A8BSS9 * LXABXX.XTXSS
J T O 1, 1992
(PXLXvS-BCOMPA)

ajvzjurcs
4-30-92

M8BTS
PSBBOBAL ABBESS
1990 OIIC C09VOK VA1I
1983 SUSSUSBBR MAT 2 2 POOT
PtnUfXBBIHOB VZB0XHXA
PUBBXSBtBO* NOBSSXXBOS
PUBBXM88XI199 HOODSXDOS
1989 P0S8CHE
1984 J 8 8 P
DIAMONDS
OGLO
BBAMDOB O o n W f VALOB
DXSCOOSS OH HOTXS 0 2 0 *
1

TOH

1 7 - J u » - » 2 JUDOS WXZJCXB80M DBCZSZOH JUSB 1 6 , 1 9 9 2
0 6 1 4 8 AM - — _ —•

19,000
0
7,375
4,300
3,500
42,180
5,000
3,000
400
378,417
(38,088)

19,000
"?. :ai""::;: 5

4,500
3,500

42,190
3,000
400

376,417
(38 f 068)

1,107,897

799f123

37 f 000

37,000
3,000
.32,000

318,775

LTABXLXTZBB
HOTS PAX XE1 BAMX
BOSS PAT PXSBV sBoostxn
HOTS PAYABLS ftXVBB MBADOWB
SOTS PAYABZJI KXSDSB PKABOBS
BOSS PAYABI* X8A8SL COAVfl
M0B9O PAS WOODBXDOB
MOSSO PAS
M0BSO PAS

5,000
32,00©

270,000
27,000
172 f 000
44,000
67,087
(40,998)
13,209
10,490
9,000

KAXSKftXXS PSBSOBAX. U A » X Z £ * X 8 1 I

LSB8 BATHS'• PASBSB MOSSS
BOXBOWBD PROM BABA COAXB
BOJUtOITSD fltOM OBAC3 COATS
PUSDO BOBBOVBD BS KAZ8S PBOti CSXZdSBB
TOSAX. T.TUBXIXTTBB
SOBTB

441,792

419,000

488,108

377,122
(188,089)

CABS SO BQUAXiXSB
488,108

!•
3

233,092

AZ^MOSS 4 $ 2 , 0 0 0 PBS HOSTS POS 1 0 YBABB OPTXOH $ 1 2 0 , 0 0 0 CA8B BUYOUT
C8XLD BtfPPOBX BABBD OS $ 1 3 7 , 3 9 8 PBX XBAX AEPOX $ 1 , 9 0 0 PEB NOSTH
$ 3 7 , 0 0 0 XX JUDOBMBBX8
$ 2 0 , 0 0 0 XS ATTOtlSSX PBB0
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IN T H E THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
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The Court having heretofore entered

a Decree of Divorce dissolving the marriage entered into between
t
t r i a l , t h e Court having considered the testimony

E
itnesses

presented and the documents admitted into evidence, having reviewed

the pleadings and file herein, and now being familiar in the
premises f does enter its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as
follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

While the Defendant has asked the Court to award

joint custody in this matter, there has been no pleading filed by
the Defendant seeking joint custody, and the differences between
the parties in this case is such that the parties could not
facilitate or cooperate in an award of joint custody.

It will be

in the best interests of the children if the Plaintiff is awarded
custody subject to reasonable rights of visitation being reserved
in the Defendant.
2.

The Plaintiff has requested

that the Defendant

exercise visitation only in a supervised capacity.

However, the

Court is persuaded that both parties have problems which each of
them have created for themselves as parents and which have affected
the emotional lives of the children.
interviewed

the

children,

it

has

While the Court has not
read

the

reports

of

the

therapists, and it is clear that the children do have fear toward
their father, much of which has been generated by their mother.
The Court finds that there are two adults before the Court who love
their children, but have committed acts against each other which
have seriously affected their children. There is concern about the
2

father's dysfunction and the mother informing the children of his
dysfunction.
3.

The

parties

jurisdiction of the Court.

have

submitted

themselves

to

the

It is the determination of the Court

that action must be taken to attempt to reinstate

a normal

relationship between the children and both of their parents, a
relationship which has suffered destruction for which both of the
parents are responsible. In that regard, the Court finds that both
of the parents, the Plaintiff
professional counseling

and the Defendant, need some

regarding

raising the children.

The

Plaintiff needs very strong counseling to assist her in letting the
children be children and letting them be friends with their father
so that they can love and respect him and seek his fatherly advice.
The father needs counseling to re-build his image as a result of
comments made by the Plaintiff, much of which was probably true;
some made as a result of the Defendant not paying child support
while he was taking vacations and enjoying life, as well as having
encounters or affairs.

It will be necessary for the Defendant to

engage in counseling to attempt to rehabilitate himself in his
relationship with the children.
4.

While there has been testimony before the Court that

the Defendant suffers from a sexual addiction, there has been
nothing to persuade the Court that he has abused the children,
3

either

physically

or

sexually,

nor

is

there

anything

which

indicates to the Court that the Defendant is going to abuse the
children in that way.

In addition, there is no evidence to

convince the Court that the Defendant is a pedophile or would
engage in any criminal activity toward the children.
5.
to

visit

The Court finds that the Defendant should be allowed

with

the

children

during

the

summer

of

1992

for

unsupervised daytime visits. A specific schedule will be necessary
to accomplish reasonable visitation.

The Court will outline a

schedule, and if counsel and the parties can work out something
which is more satisfactory, the Court will have no objection to
such a schedule. However, a reasonable visitation schedule will be
as follows:
a.
preferable.

Every other Saturday or Sunday, whichever is

However, unless there is a different election by the

parties, the day will be Sunday from 10:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m.
without supervision.
b.

One day during the alternate week from 12:00

noon until 7:00 p.m. in the evening on Wednesday evening or an
alternate evening if the parties elect.
c.

While the children remain in Utah during the

summer, the Defendant will have every other red letter holiday from
10:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. commencing with July 4, 1992.
4

d.

When the children return to Virginia, the

Defendant may travel to Virginia and visit with the children
anytime he is in the area during the daytime until 7:00 p.m. in the
evening. If the children come to the Salt Lake area while they are
residing in Virginia, then the Defendant shall have the additional
right to visit with the children during the daytime while they are
in Salt Lake City, and he will have to request that visitation.
e.

There will not be any overnight visitation nor

will the children be required to come from Virginia to Utah to
visit for six months.

During that time, each of the parties are

expected to receive counseling.

Following the counseling, and

after January 1, the Defendant will have the right to visit with
the children depending upon his income ability by bringing the
children to Utah for one-half of the Christmas holiday, two weeks
in the summertime during 1993 and expanded summer visits to four
weeks beginning in 1994.

In addition, if there is an additional

vacation for the children from school such as Spring vacation or
Easter vacation, then the Defendant may bring the children to Utah
for visitation during one-half of that vacation time. Finally, the
Defendant will be allowed to exercise Thanksgiving with the
children in Utah during every other year.
6.
schedule

The paternal grandmother has requested a visitation

from the Court.

While the paternal grandmother is
5

entitled to visitation, this Court cannot enter an Order effecting
the rights of the paternal grandmother when she is not a party to
the action before the Court. Before such an Order can be entered,
the paternal grandmother will have to petition this Court to seek
an Order for specific visitation rights.
7.

The

children

have

counseling by Mr. Thomas Harrison.

been

receiving

therapeutic

The Court finds that there is

a great deal of antagonism between Mr. Harrison and the Defendant.
The Court recognizes that the Defendant is a person who wants his
own way, even demands his own way, and when he doesn't get it, he
tries to force it through other actions.
Defendant's

antagonism

is not

productive

However, while the
and

should

not be

recognized by the Court to allow the Defendant to get what he
wants, the Court does recognize that the relationship between Mr.
Harrison as the counselor and the Defendant as the children's
father, may no longer be productive to resolving problems between
the Defendant and the children. Since antagonism appears to exist
between the counselor and the Defendant, the Court finds that it
will be in the best interest of the parties and the children to
place the children with another therapist.
8.
necessary

The Court finds that all of the counseling which is

to assist

the parties

and the children

commenced within thirty (30) days of June 16, 1992.
6

should be

9.

In reviewing the evidence presented by the parties

regarding their incomes, the Court has heard no testimony as to
income of the Plaintiff, except that she has stipulated that she
can earn at least $1,000.00 per month.

The Court accepts the

Stipulation of the Plaintiff and finds that $1,000.00 earned income
should be imputed or attributed to the Plaintiff for each month.
Regarding the income of the Defendant, the Court is not persuaded
by the testimony presented and by the exhibits admitted, when
taking into consideration the lifestyle of these parties, that they
could live in the style and manner they have from an income of
$22,000.00 per year or $16,000.00 per year as represented by the
Defendant. The Court finds that the parties could not live in that
lifestyle even on an income of $58,000.00 per year. Based upon the
evidence presented by all of the accountants and expert witnesses,
the Court is persuaded that the best evidence relating to the
Defendant's income is shown by Plaintiff's Exhibit "P-96," except
for the year 1991.

The Court finds that for the purpose of

determining the Defendant's income, the best evidence is to use
Plaintiff's Exhibit "P-96," but to use the evidence presented by
the Defendant for the year 1991 to show his total income as
reported to the Internal Revenue Service. Accordingly, the Court
finds that Plaintiff's Exhibit "P-96" should be amended to state
the amounts on what the parties have referred to as "above the
7

line" which are taken directly from the Defendant's tax returns and
the Defendant's exhibit which show an adjusted gross income of
$22,222.00 for the year 1991 with no taxes paid.
adjustment

has

been

made,

the

appropriate

After this

calculations

and

adjustments will be made "below the line" on Plaintiff's Exhibit
"P-96" and Defendant's income for the purposes of determining child
support will be the average "estimated gross spendable income,"
which the Court believes will come out at approximately $120,000.00
per year. The Court finds that will be the best evidence as to the
income of the Defendant.

The Court finds that the testimony

presented by Defendant's Exhibit "D-61" simply is not credible when
it presents to the Court an average income of approximately
$35,000.00 per year.

The parties simply could not live the

lifestyle they have in the past on that type of income.
10.

Based on the foregoing, attached hereto as Appendix

A and made a part hereof by reference is the revised and amended
copy of Plaintiff's Exhibit "P-96" with the adjustments ordered to
be made to that Exhibit. The Court finds from Attachment A hereto
that

the

Defendant's

annual

income

is

$137,596.00

per year

resulting in a gross monthly income of $11,466.00 per month.

For

the purpose of determining child support, the total income of the
parties is $12,466.00 per year. Attached hereto as Attachment "B"
and made a part hereof by reference is the Uniform Child Support
8

Worksheet for this case.

Based thereonf the Court finds that the

appropriate amount of child support to be paid by the Defendant to
the Plaintiff is $1,891.00 per month. Such payments are to be made
timely by the Defendant so they will be received by the Plaintiff
one-half on the fifth and one-half on the twentieth days of each
without any delay in the payments, said payments commencing from
the date of ruling in this matter, June 16, 1992.

Child support

shall be paid until such times as the minor children reach the age
of majority or graduate from high school, whichever shall occur
later.
11.

During the term of the marriage, the Defendant has

maintained health and accident insurance for the benefit of the
minor children, and the Court finds that it reasonable for him to
continue to do so for so long as he is obligated to pay child
support for their benefit. Any medical expenses incurred for the
minor children which are not paid for by the policy of health and
accident insurance will be paid on a ratio proportionate to the
parties' income, the Plaintiff paying eight percent (8%) and the
Defendant paying ninety-two percent (92%) of such uninsured medical
expenses, provided, however, that the Plaintiff will pay uninsured
routine medical and dental expenses, including routine office
visits, physical examinations and immunizations.
definition,

all medical care, including
9

For purposes of

dental, orthodontia,

counseling, and all other related health care, shall be construed
to be medical treatment for the children.
12.

Based upon the evidence presented and the length of

the marriage, the Court finds that an award of alimony in this case
is appropriate to allow the Plaintiff to continue to live in a
lifestyle to which she has reasonably become accustomed during the
marriage.

In addition, the Defendant has the ability to pay

alimony to the Plaintiff and, in light of the parties' lifestyle,
the earned income, and all other relative evidence received by the
Court relating to the issue of alimony, this Court does find that
an award of alimony is appropriate, but in light of the parties7
ages, and the potential ability of the Plaintiff to earn income,
the award of alimony should not be without a time limitation. The
Court finds that based upon the duration of the marriage, ten
years, is an appropriate time for the Defendant to pay alimony and
$2,000.00 per month is an appropriate amount to be paid.

In

addition, based upon the Defendant's historic failure to pay
alimony as required by the terms of the Temporary Order, and based
upon the Plaintiff's willingness to accept a lump sum payment, the
Court finds that the award of alimony may be satisfied by the
Defendant paying a lump sum payment of $120,000.00 as full and
complete satisfaction of alimony, but that election must be made
within the next sixty (60) days and paid on or before August 16,
10

1992.

All payments of alimony are to be made by the Defendant to

the Plaintiff so that they are received by the Plaintiff one-half
on or before the 5th and one-half on or before the 20th days of
each month.
13.

The Court finds that with the support obligations

which have been ordered to be paid by the Defendant, it is
reasonable that such obligations be guaranteed in the event of the
Defendant's

death.

During

the

marriage,

the

parties

have

maintained insurance on the Defendant's life, and it is reasonable
that such insurance shall continue in full force and effect until
the Defendant is no longer obligated to pay child support or
alimony in this case.

The life insurance policy shall be in. the

same amounts as has been carried during the marriage.

When the

requirement to pay alimony ceases, then the Defendant may terminate
life insurance for the benefit of the Plaintiff, and decrease it so
that he is providing life insurance for the minor children as
beneficiaries, except that the policy shall designate that the
Plaintiff is to receive the funds on behalf of the children for so
long as the Defendant is obligated to pay child support.
14.

For the purpose of determining the marital estate,

the Court adopts Plaintiff's Exhibit "P-91" for valuation and
distribution with certain revisions which will be stated herein.
Plaintiff's Exhibit "P-91" is to be revised and attached to these
11

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as Exhibit "C" to reflect
the Court's Order and the distribution of the marital estate.
determining

the

values

of

the

assets

and

the

In

outstanding

liabilities, the Court finds as follows:
a.

The

value

of

the

real

property

at

36

Northridge, Sandy, Utah is $273,000.00, and that property will be
awarded to the Plaintiff.
b.

The Court finds that the best evidence for the

value of the home at 11807 South Woodridge, Sandy, Utah, was the
appraisal presented by the Plaintiff's expert, Mr. Bodell, and that
value is $106,500.00.

The Court finds that the parties' interest

in the Woodridge property is fifty percent (50%) of the $106,500.00
or $53,250.00.
c.

The Court is persuaded that the duplex at 3708

South 3325 West is actually owned in its entirety by the parties,
and that the Defendant's brother has no interest in said property
other than the fact that his name may be on the title. Defendant's
brother has made no payments on the duplex and has made no tax
claims either.

That property is awarded to the Defendant at a

value of $46,000.00.
d.

While the Court is suspect of the appraisals on

the furniture and furnishings which have come before the Court, it
is clear that the only reliable evidence regarding the furnishings
. 12

now located in Virginia have come from an appraiser. Accordingly,
even though the Court is convinced that the personal property
cannot be replaced for $7,000.00, the only expert valuation which
the Court has is the appraisal

submitted

by the Plaintiff.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the furnishings in Virginia are
valued at $7,375.00 and that those furniture and furnishings will
be awarded to the Plaintiff.
e.
furnishings.

There is no contest regarding the Woodridge

The value has been stated by both parties at

$3,500.00 and those furnishings should be awarded to the Defendant
at that value.
f.

Regarding the Northridge furnishings, the Court

is not persuaded that the Defendant understood the intent of his
own testimony regarding his stated value of the personal property
while he was testifying. The Court is convinced that the Defendant
was stating the value that the property had to him and that it
probably cost that much.

While the Defendant testified that the

value of the property was $18,000.00, and there is no other
evidence before the Court relating to the value of that personal
property, the Court finds that the property actually has a lesser
value than testified to by the Defendant, and that it should be
arbitrarily reduced to approximately twenty-five percent (25%) of
its stated value.

The Court finds the value of the Northridge
13

furnishings to be $4,5CO. 00, and that property will be awarded to
the Defendant.
g.

The values stated on Plaintiff's Exhibit "P-91"

regarding the Porsche automobile, the GMC van and the Jeep, are all
adopted by the Court as being the best evidence of the value of
those automobiles, and the automobiles will be awarded to each of
the parties as stated on Plaintiff's Exhibit "P-91."
h.

The Court has received

a great amount of

testimony regarding the boat and its value, but the Court was
persuaded from the outset, and is even more convinced after hearing
all of the testimony, that the Plaintiff had possession of the
boat, she did not have sufficient funds to pay her expenses and to
raise her children because the Defendant was not paying child
support or alimony as ordered, and she sold the boat to meet the
family needs.

The best evidence before the Court is that the

Plaintiff received $4,300.00 from the sale of the boat. While the
Court

is of the opinion that the boat was worth more than

$4,300.00, and in fact, the Plaintiff received more than $4,300.00,
but after payment for repairs and other costs, the net benefit to
the Plaintiff was $4,300.00. It was as a result of actions on the
part of the Defendant, by his failure to pay support as ordered,
that the Plaintiff received only $4,300.00 for the sale of the
boat.

The Court finds $4,300.00 to be the best value to be
14

attributed to the boat, and the boat should be awarded to the
Plaintiff.

However, in light of amounts, which are discussed

later, the amount

attributed to the value

of the boat to the

Plaintiff will be taken off of the division of assets.
i.

The Court finds the balance of the assets to be

as stated on Plaintiff's Exhibit "P-91," including all investments
and cash, except as follows:
(1) The investment diamonds should be added as
an asset and awarded to the Plaintiff at a value of $3,000.00.
(2)

The Brandon Canyon cash amount stated as

a negative dollar value of $6,266.00 should be eliminated.

In

addition, the note on Lot 23 for Brandon Canyon, Lots 4, 15, 16 and
17, Brandon Canyon, should all be eliminated.
thoroughly

convinced

that

the

Court

has

The Court is not

received

information relating to Brandon Canyon as an asset.
Court

is

reasonably

persuaded

that

the

values

all

of

the

However, the

stated

by

the

Defendant of $319,117.00 is a reasonable value to be attributed to
Brandon Canyon, except for the fact that the Defendant has received
or will receive additional money for the sale of lots, for example,
he has already sold Lot 16 for $171,900.00.

The Court finds that

as Brandon Canyon is developed and the lots are finished, the
Defendant will sell more homes and will receive additional profit.
The Court finds that the evidence is so conflicted that it will be
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necessary to adopt some arbitrary number to determine the .value.
Accordingly, the Court is convinced that the value of Brandon
Canyon is at least some portion of Lot 16 which has been sold, and
the value stated by the Defendant of $319,117.

While it is

arbitrary, the Court finds that the only reasonable method for
placing a value on Brandon Canyon is to take one-third of the value
of the sale of Lot 16, which was $171,900.00 and add that to the
values stated by the Defendant. Accordingly, the Court finds that
the value of Brandon Canyon is $319,117.00, plus $57,300.00 for a
total value of $376,417.00 and Brandon Canyon will be awarded to
the Defendant at that value.
(3)

The

notes

receivable

on Plaintiff's

Exhibit "P-91" will be adjusted and a discount will be allowed.
The Defendant asserted a discount rate of forty-one percent (41%)
while the Plaintiff presented a discount rate of ten percent (10%).
The Court finds that the discount rate of the Defendant is too high
and the discount rate of the Plaintiff is too low.

There is no

evidence which convinces the Court that any specific number is more
appropriate than another.

However, based upon

the evidence

presented, the Court does find that a twenty percent (20%) discount
rate is a reasonable rate to be applied to the note and Plaintiff's
Exhibit "P-91" should be recomputed stating the notes at a value
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showing twenty percent (20%) discount and then the notes should be
awarded to the Defendant at those amounts.
(4)

The Court received no testimony regarding

the asset identified as target capital.

That asset

should be

eliminated.
j.

With

the

foregoing

adjustments

to

values,

Plaintiff's Exhibit "P-91" should be used to calculate all of the
assets awarded to each of the parties and the assets should then be
awarded as stated on that Exhibit.
k.

The Court adopts all of the liabilities as

stated in Exhibit "P-91" and makes specific findings as follows:
(1)

The notes payable to Key Bank, First

Security Bank for River Meadows, the mortgage on Woodridge, the
mortgage on Northridgef the duplex and the funds borrowed from Sara
Coats and Grace Coatsf are accurate at the values stated f and shall
be paid by each of the parties as designated on Plaintiff's Exhibit
"P-91."
(2)

The Court finds the liability owed to

Isabell Coats to be $270,000.00.

There was conflicting evidence

presented to the Court as to the amount
Isabell Coats.

of liability

owed to

Isabell Coats testified to the Court and stated

that Defendant's Exhibit "D-50" showed all of the obligation owed
by the Defendant to her.

The total amount of the notes which make
17

up

Defendant's

Exhibit

"D-50"

is

$270,000.00.

While

the

Defendant's certified public accountant testified on the amount of
the notes and stated that the outstanding balance was $411,025.00,
that amount was never verified by Isabell Coats, and the Court
cannot reconcile in its mind the difference between the amount
testified to by the certified public accountant and the amount
testified to by Defendant's mother, who is the creditor on the
note.

The Court finds that the most credible evidence is that of

the creditor and if she were owed more than $270,000.00, that
testimony certainly would have been presented to the Court.

That

is especially true in the mind of the Court when the Defendant
placed Isabell Coats on the stand out of time to be able to get her
testimony in regarding the liability and the amount owed to her by
the Defendant. Accordingly, the Court specifically finds that the
preponderance of the evidence is that the outstanding note owed to
Isabell Coats is in the amount of $270,000.00.
(3)

In reviewing the liability owed by the

Plaintiff as presented by Exhibit "P-78," the Court is not going to
allow the amounts of those liabilities which is owed to Plaintiff's
father.

Those amounts are to subtracted from the liabilities owed

by the Plaintiff and Plaintiff Exhibit "P-91M is to reflect that
change in liability.

18

(4)

The Plaintiff has testified that she has

borrowed $5,000.00 from one of the children's trust accounts which
is not reflected on Exhibit "P-91." That Exhibit, again, should be
modified to reflect that liability as being owed by the Plaintiff.
After the
Plaintiff's Exhibit
equalize

foregoing changes

have been made to

"P-91", the Court finds that in order to

the marital

estate, and pursuant

to Attachment

"C"

attached to these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it will
be necessary for the Defendant to pay the Plaintiff $144,070.00 to
equalize the distribution of the marital estate.

The Plaintiff

should be awarded judgment against the Defendant for that amount.
15.

There have been trust accounts established for the

benefit of the children.

The Plaintiff has been ordered to

reimburse the children's accounts for funds that have been borrowed
from those accounts. The parties are not to draw any further funds
from

the accounts

of the children,

except

by

agreement

and

signature of both parents, or the children if the funds have not
been disbursed by the time the children reach the age of majority.
16.

The Defendant was ordered to pay temporary child

support and alimony in this matter.

The Court finds that the

Defendant did have knowledge of the existence of the Order and the
amounts he was ordered to pay.

Further, the Defendant did have

sufficient assets, sufficient means and sufficient income to pay
19

the obligations he was ordered to pay. The Defendant willfully and
intentionally, and without just cause, failed to obey the Orders of
the Court and failed to pay the outstanding obligations he was
directed to pay.

Pursuant to the laws and cases in the state of

Utah and specifically under Utah Code Annotated. §78-32-10, the
Defendant is in contempt of the Order of the Court.

The Court

finds that it is reasonable for the Defendant to be fined an amount
of $200.00 and to be imprisoned in the Salt Lake County Jail for
thirty (30) days for his contempt.
However, the Court finds it is reasonable that the
sentence to jail and the fine should be stayed upon the Defendant
paying the amounts he has previously been ordered to pay by the
Temporary Order.

The Defendant must pay $13,810.97 on or before

June 26, 1992, and an additional $13,810.97 on or before July 26,
1992, for a total payment of $27,621.94.
17.

The Court finds that the foregoing is the amount

which the Defendant is delinquent pursuant to the Temporary Order
entered in this matter. The finding of the delinquency is made by
using the total amount which the Plaintiff claims the Defendant
should have paid, $79,901.41. However, the Plaintiff stated to the
Court that there may be some amounts which should be removed.
While neither party saw fit to go through the Plaintiff's Exhibit
and specifically eliminate amounts which should not have been paid
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pursuant to the Order, each agreed that some amounts might be
eliminated. The Court has simply adopted ten percent reduction as
a reasonable amount to eliminate from the expenses submitted by the
Plaintiff.

After reducing $79,901.41 by ten percent and then

giving the Defendant credit for payment of $44f289.33 which the
Plaintiff agrees the Defendant has paid toward temporary support
pursuant to the terms of the existing Temporary Order, that leaves
a balance of $27,621.94 as previously stated by the Court.
18.

The Defendant should receive credit against the

amount owed for any charges made on his credit cards by the
Plaintiff, which have not been charged back to the Plaintiff.

In

addition, he should receive a credit in the amount of $500.00 for
a snow blower which was sold by the Plaintiff. There should be no
further deductions from the amount to be paid by the Defendant for
the past due support.

If the Defendant fails to make payment as

ordered on or before July 26, 1992, then he should report to the
Salt Lake County Jail for incarceration therein for thirty (30)
days.
19.

During these proceedings, the Plaintiff received

checks in the amount of approximately $400.00 which were dividend
checks.

She deposited those checks to the account of Peter Coats,

Jr., believing that the money belonged to Peter, Jr. The Plaintiff
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should write a check from the account of Peter Coats, Jr. to the
Defendant for the amount of those dividends.
20.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has incurred

substantial attorney's fees in this matter, well in excess of
$40,000.00.

The Plaintiff is in need of assistance to pay her

attorney's fees and the Defendant has a substantially greater
ability to assist in the payment of those fees than does the
Plaintiff.

The Court finds that the time and costs incurred were

reasonable for the work performed on behalf of the Plaintiff and
the rate charged for both attorney's fees and legal assistant
services were also reasonable when considered within the community
standards.

The Court finds that a reasonable amount for the

Defendant to contribute to the Plaintiff for her attorney's fees is
$20,000.00 and the Plaintiff should be awarded additional judgment
against the Defendant in the amount of $20,000.00 as payment toward
her attorney's fees.

The Court specifically finds that under the

case of Peterson v. Peterson, the Court is not persuaded that case
holds that professional experts, such as accountants, doctors,
engineers and others, are the kind of expert that the Appellate
Court contemplated would receive consideration for payment of
expert fees. The Court finds that the case of Peterson v. Peterson
addresses the payment of expert fees only for professionals as it
relates to custody issues and evaluators. The Court finds that the
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Plaintiff's request for expert's fees for the professional who have
testified in this matter and assisted the Plaintiff in preparation
of her case, should be denied.
21.

The Defendant should be ordered to specifically

indemnify the Plaintiff

from any tax liability which may be

incurred by the parties for the filing of tax returns for all prior
years,

unless

additional

misrepresentation

or

tax

fraud

assessment

on

the

part

has

been

of

the

caused

by

Plaintiff.

Accordingly, the Defendant should be ordered to indemnify and hold
the Plaintiff harmless from all tax liabilities for all past years
which may be assessed against the parties.
In considering tax ramifications, the Court finds that in
this case, it is reasonable that the Defendant be awarded one of
the minor children as a dependent for the purpose of filing his
state and federal income tax returns and the Plaintiff will be
awarded two of the children for that purpose.

Further, it is

reasonable that if the Plaintiff is not able to utilize two
children as a deduction, then she should be obligated to notify the
Defendant and allow him to utilize one or both of those deductions
for the purpose of filing his state and federal income tax returns.
22.

The Court finds that the Defendant's request that

the children exercise extended visitation with him this summer for
the purpose of attending a family reunion is not reasonable in
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light of the need for a specific visitation schedule which has
already been addressed by the Court• Specifically, the Court finds
that the Defendant's request for such visitation be denied.
23.

In this case, it will be necessary that a permanent

injunction be entered against both parties to enjoin them from
talking about each other in front of the children, degrading each
other, or taking any action which would be denigrating to the
position of one parent.

Each party

shall be enjoined from

discussing the proceedings in this case with the children or
providing them with access to any information or any of the
pleadings in this case.

Any action by either of the parties in

violation of this injunction should be construed a contempt of
Court and punished accordingly.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, this Court
does now enter its just and equitable Conclusions of Law as
follows:
1.

A Decree of Divorce has heretofore been entered in

this matter and a Supplemental Decree of Divorce should now be
entered to reflect the foregoing Findings of Fact.
2.

A Decree of Divorce should incorporate all of the

terms of the Findings of Fact and should reference to the Findings
of Fact for purposes of interpretation, including attachments
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hereto, which should be made a part hereof and referenced for any
future interpretation of the intent of the Court.
3.

This Court does conclude that the Defendant is in

contempt of prior Orders of this Court and that he should be fined
and sentenced to jail for his contempt.

However, the Court does

find that the sentence should be stayed if the Defendant complies
with the Order of the Court.

In the event the Defendant fails to

comply with the Order of the Court, a bench warrant should be
issued for his arrest and incarceration in the Salt Lake County
Jail forthwith.
4.
and

against

Judgment should be entered in favor of the Plaintiff
the

Defendant

pursuant

to the Findings

of Fact

heretofore entered in this matter and the attachments hereto.
Judgment should accrue interest at the lawful rate allowed for
judgments.
5.

All pleadings entered herein should become final

upon entry.
DATED this

f

day of

£ZZ^-*-*-

1992.

BY THE COURT:

District Court Judge
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